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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, two uniquely American experiences so grossly offended
an individual right that a bitterly divided Supreme Court had to step
in. Foreigners scoff at the idea of electing judges. Nor do they approve of heavy financial contributions to campaigns. Certainly no
other country cloaks the right to give money with the maximum protection accorded by law the way our Constitution does with the First
Amendment. When these factors all play out in a story that makes for
a best-selling novel, then there are fireworks, public outrage, and, as
1
the Chief Justice lamented, a chance to make bad law. Fortunately,
there is an evenhanded jurisprudential principle that courts may dispatch to referee the showdown in future cases.
Judicial elections began to gain popularity in the mid-nineteenth
century “as part of the Jacksonian movement toward greater popular
2
control of public office.” By the Civil War, over half of the states
3
elected their judges, and today thirty-nine states elect all or part of
4
their judiciary. As many as eighty-seven percent of all state judges
5
face an election of some kind. As judicial elections have transformed
6
from dignified low-key affairs into polarized political contests, critics
like Sandra Day O’Connor have launched prominent efforts to per7
suade states to eliminate the practice of judicial elections. Some
8
states appear to be listening for good reason. Take the words of

1

2

3
4
5
6
7

8

See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (citing the legal aphorism “hard cases make bad law” to describe extreme cases that test the boundaries of established legal principles).
Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal
and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Id.
Randall T. Shepard, Electing Judges and the Impact on Judicial Independence, 42 TENN. B. J. 22,
23 (2006).
Id.
As the Chief Justice of Indiana noted, “judicial elections are progressively looking more
like elections in the executive and legislative branches.” Id.
See Bill Mears, Former Justice O’Connor Leads Push to End Judicial Elections, CNN.COM (Dec.
15, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/15/judicial.elections/index.html (reporting that Sandra Day O’Connor seeks reform in election-based judicial systems as they
raise doubts regarding a judge’s impartiality).
See, e.g., John Schwartz, Efforts Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2009, at A12 (reporting that Nevada and Ohio are considering changes to their judicial
selection process).
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Richard Neely, an elected justice of West Virginia, for example, who
once wrote, “[a]s long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from
out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to
do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s
9
money away, but so is my job security.”
Enter the 2009 Supreme Court decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey
10
Coal Co. At a minimum, Caperton exposes the pitfalls of judicial elections and calls into question the reach of the Due Process Clause in
protecting a litigant’s right to a fair tribunal before a fair judge. Discussed in more detail below, the case involved the refusal of a state
supreme court justice to recuse himself, where a litigant who later
had an appeal pending before the justice spent over three million
dollars to support the justice’s campaign. The Supreme Court held
that because there was an objective appearance of bias, due process
required recusal. Caperton has reignited the debate over judicial elections and the circumstances where a judge must recuse himself to
11
12
avoid violating the Due Process Clause, with the media, politicians,
13
14
15
16
academics, interest groups, judges, and lawyers all weighing in.
A review of the Supreme Court’s recusal jurisprudence reveals the
need for a due process test that balances constitutional concerns
while taking into account the expanding role of the Due Process
9
10
11

12

13

14

15

16

Small Steps: The Road to Prosperity Runs Through the Judiciary, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23,
2010, at 29.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
See Caperton v. Massey Resource Page, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/in_depth_issues_guides/caperton_resource_
page/index.cfm (showing news anchor on CNN discussing debate regarding judicial elections).
See Erica Peterson, WV Politicians React to Supreme Court Decision, W. VA. PUB.
BROADCASTING (June 8, 2009), http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=9950 (reporting the reactions of West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin and Senator Jeff Kessler to
the Supreme Court decision).
See Caperton v. Massey Coal and the Recusal of State Court Judges, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY
(Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/291663-1 (showing panel discussion of academics at Georgetown University Law Center regarding Caperton and its effects).
See Caperton v. Massey, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (June 8, 2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/caperton_v_massey/ (reporting the
reaction of interest group leaders, such as the president of the American Bar Association
and the executive director of Justice at Stake).
See Ed Brayton, Michigan Leaders React to Caperton Ruling, THE MICH. MESSENGER (June
10, 2009), http://michiganmessenger.com/20664/Michigan-leaders-react-to-capertonruling (showing the positive reaction of Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court).
See Steve Foley, WV Legal Experts React to Caperton v. Massey Ruling, THE MINORITY REPORT
(June 8, 2009), http://www.theminorityreportblog.com/blog_entry/steve_foley/2009/
06/08/ (reporting the reaction of several attorneys to the Caperton ruling).
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Clause in mandating recusals. Beginning from the common-law,
which required a direct pecuniary interest, the Court has gradually
extended the requirement of recusal to include cases with less than
direct financial interests, cases where previous judicial appearances
had created a conflict, and most recently where there is an objective
appearance of bias.
This Article argues that given Caperton’s push in this jurisprudence
and the constitutional freedoms it now potentially sweeps, when assessing motions for recusals, courts should use the careful Mathews v.
Eldridge test to assess whether there has been a violation of due
process. This is good policy because Mathews confronts the tension
between the First Amendment and procedural due process, while
containing the scope of Caperton, all without sacrificing its principles.
And, as explained below, given the test’s linear structure, applying
Mathews to recusal motions based on traditional pre-Caperton concerns would not change the analysis.
Part I provides an overview of the Due Process Clause and when it
requires recusal of judges. It starts by outlining the many applications of due process, then focuses on procedural due process, specifically when it requires judicial recusal. It details a series of cases, culminating in Caperton, that consider judicial recusal. With this
background, Part II examines the boundaries of the First Amendment as they relate to judicial elections, addressing the controversial
proposition that recusals do not burden speech. Part III then argues
that given the complications that Caperton has added to the due
process jurisprudence, applying the Mathews test is not only in line
with the Court’s precedence, but it makes for good policy: It would
contain Caperton, alleviating the dissenter’s concerns, while taking into account the concerns that drove the majority’s decision.
II. WHEN DUE PROCESS DEMANDS RECUSAL
A. Overview of Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
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nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
17
laws.

This language has been interpreted to protect both the substantive
18
and procedural rights of individuals. Specifically, as one federal
court recently explained, the Due Process Clause operates in three
19
primary ways : (1) it incorporates many provisions of the Bill of
20
Rights against the States; (2) it bars certain government action that
affects certain substantive rights “regardless of the fairness of the pro21
cedures used to implement them”; and (3) it guarantees fair proce22
dures.
With regard to the guarantee of fair procedures—commonly referred to as procedural due process—courts closely scrutinize state
action that has the effect of depriving an individual of “life, liberty, or
23
property.” The Supreme Court has found such violations in many
17

18

19

20

21

22
23



U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Due Process Clause is derived from the
Magna Carta, which read in relevant part: “No freemen shall be taken and imprisoned or
disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, §
XXXIX (1215), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.htm; see also
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words from
Magna Charta [sic], incorporated into the constitution . . . after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled down
to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government . . . .”).
See, e.g., Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (“This Clause
clothes individuals with the right to both substantive and procedural due process.”) (citation omitted).
See Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274, at *16–18 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 26, 2007) (“The Due Process Clause provides three types of protections.”); see also
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is the source of three different kinds of
constitutional protection.”).
This is the rationale behind § 1983 claims. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990) (“First, the [Due Process] Clause incorporates many of the specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights.”).
Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). This substantive guarantee
extends to many areas of law. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(privacy); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 392 (1923) (education in foreign languages).
See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (explaining that procedural due process prevents government from freely depriving individuals of liberty of property).
An interesting question of state action arises in the context of prison facilities operated by
private contractors. For example, in Correctional Services Corporation. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61, 71 (2001), the Court decided that the holding of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which recognized an implied private action for violations of constitutional rights, did not extend to private correctional facilities.
In doing so, the Court assumed that due process is required in privatized correctional in-
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25

contexts, including administrative action, the reach of a state’s
26
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the procedures accompanying the
27
Regardless of the context in
issuance of a writ of garnishment.
which a procedural due process violation is alleged, the Court applies
a two-step analysis. The first step is determining whether the state has
in fact deprived an individual of a protected interest—life, liberty, or
28
property. A deprivation of a protected interest, however, is not itself
29
unconstitutional; rather, once the court has found a deprivation of a
protected interest, the second step is to determine whether the state
30
deprived the individual of that interest without due process of law.
Put another way, a constitutional violation will arise only if the Court
finds that the state deprived the individual of that interest without
31
due process of law. Therefore, a procedural due process violation is
32
independent of the merits of the underlying claim.

24

25

26

27
28

29
30
31
32

stitutions, but did not decide the question. See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,
412 (1997) (concluding that “private prison guards, unlike those who work directly for
the government, do not enjoy immunity from suit in a § 1983 case”).
See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 269 (1991) (noting that procedural due process is implicated by, for example, “disciplining prisoners and
school children, suspending drivers’ licenses and welfare benefits, terminating employment and parental rights, curtailing public programs, prosecuting public offenders, and
compelling public access to beachfront property”).
Compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–386 (1908) (requiring notice and
an opportunity to be heard in actions where site-specific taxes are irrevocably fixed) with
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (stating
that general statutes that affect taxes do not require notice and an opportunity to be
heard).
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that due process
prevents a state from making binding judgments against “defendant[s] with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations”).
See, e.g., N. Ga. Fishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (holding that issuance of writs of garnishment must not violate due process).
The Court has struggled to define this step. For instance, in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S.
918 (1951) (per curiam), the Court applied what has later been termed the
“right/privilege” distinction. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES & COMMENTS 774–83 (10th ed. 2003). The Court seemed to
retreat from this standard in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570
(1972), where the Court defined the liberty and property interest in more specific terms.
See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (moving further away from the entitlement analysis of Bailey v. Richardson); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 484 (1977)
(criticizing the Court’s definition of property interests).
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1978).
Id. at 259 (noting that procedural due process is meant to protect against the “mistaken or
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property” (emphasis added)).
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1989) (“[T]he constitutional violation actionable . . . is complete when the wrongful action is taken.”) (internal citation omitted).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330–31 (1976) (noting that the respondent’s “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement”).
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The question of what procedures due process demands is not easily answered. As the Supreme Court has noted, due process “is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
33
and circumstances.” To this end, the Court applies a variety of tests
to determine the appropriate level of process. In the administrative
34
context, as well as select other areas, the Court applies a balancing
35
test.
This test was borne out of the so-called “procedural due
36
process revolution” of the 1970s, which began with the watershed
37
case of Goldberg v. Kelly. In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that
New York City deprived welfare recipients of due process by not providing them with a hearing prior to terminating their welfare bene38
fits. Whatever uncertainty was created by Goldberg—and much uncertainty was created—it was resolved by the Supreme Court in
Mathews.
The Mathews test requires courts to balance three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, in-

33

34
35

36

37
38

Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting the same sentence from
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
(“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situations demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, 367 U.S. at 895 (“The very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation.”). Nonetheless, note that it is clear that at its core, procedural due
process requires notice and opportunity to be heard. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 348–49
(noting that both notice and the opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due
process); see also People v. David W., 733 N.E.2d 206, 211 (N.Y. 2000) (noting that the
“bedrock of due process is notice and opportunity to be heard”) (citing, inter alia, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265–68 (1970); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
See discussion infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (formulating an analysis of due process weighing the private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the government interest
at stake).
See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1975) (noting
that “we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due process in the last five
years than in the entire period since ratification of the Constitution”); Timothy Zick,
Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 213, 252 n.177 (2004) (charting the major cases in the establishment of procedural due process).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See id. at 261–71 (discussing the private interest in retaining welfare benefits, the government interest in promoting citizens’ sufficiency and dignity, and the administrative costs
of pre-termination hearings).
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cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
39
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

One important area where procedural due process operates to
40
limit government action is judicial recusals. Although nearly every
41
jurisdiction has a statute that requires recusal in certain situations,
courts have used procedural due process to limit the prerogative of
judges to hear every case that may come before them. That is, fundamental fairness (and thus due process) demands that a judge re42
cuse herself in certain situations. These decisions are an outgrowth
of the constitutional maxim that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
43
basic requirement of due process.”
B. Early Recusal Challenges
The Due Process Clause does not “impose a constitutional requirement that the states adopt statutes that permit disqualification
44
for bias or prejudice.” In fact, as the Supreme Court has stated, “only in the most extreme cases would disqualification” be constitutional45
ly mandated. At its most basic level, the Due Process Clause incorporates the common-law rule that recusal is required when a judge
46
has a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case. As
the Supreme Court has noted, this common-law rule is derived from
the maxim that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not im-

39
40
41
42

43

44
45

46

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See Caperton v. A..T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (citing, inter alia, Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES (2d ed. 2007).
See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (“Under our precedents there are objective standards that
require recusal when ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47)).
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (discussing
Murchison); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The requirement of neutrality has been jealously guarded by this Court.”); Friendly, supra note 36, at 1279–80
(noting that an unbiased tribunal is essential to a fair hearing). The Supreme Court has
further observed that “[t]he theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion
cannot be impartial.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878). Put another
way, an accused has the right to be tried by “a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion,
excitement, and tyrannical power.” Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1940).
Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2007)
(citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).
See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821 (requiring disqualification of a state supreme court justice
where the disposition of the matter before the court would affect that justice’s interest in
a separate legal action).
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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47

probably, corrupt his integrity.” Yet as discussed in the text that follows, the Supreme Court has gradually expanded this common-law
rule over the last century to require recusal based on due process in
new situations.
The first departure from the common-law came in 1927 when the
48
Supreme Court decided the case of Tumey v. Ohio. In that case, the
Court held that Due Process was violated where the salary of a town’s
mayor, who also served as town justice, was tied to the amount of
fines he imposed and where sums from criminal fines were deposited
49
into the general village treasury. In the face of a challenge, the
Court held that this arrangement violated the Due Process Clause
“both because of his [the individual’s] direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to gradu50
ate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.” Specifically,
the Court held:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
51
law.

In so holding, the Court departed from the narrow common-law
focus on direct pecuniary interest. Instead, the decision sought to
protect against those interests that might attempt adjudicators to
52
“disregard neutrality.” Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently explained, the due process violation in Tumey “was less than what would
53
have been considered personal or direct at common law.”
In a
number of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further defined
54
and expanded the reach of Tumey.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54



See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259; Gutierrez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428 (1995) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 524–24.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 532.
See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (noting that the Tumey Court examined conflicts of interest beyond financial involvement in a case).
Id. at 2259–60.
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, for instance, the Court, in facts similar to Tumey, invalidated a system whereby a town mayor would impose fines that went to the town’s general
treasury. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Although the mayor had no direct, personal interest in assessing a fine, the Court reasoned that a “judge’s financial stake need not be as direct or
positive as . . . in Tumey.” Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (internal citation omitted). In a later series of cases, the Court held that it is permissible for the trial judge to have been involved in some earlier proceedings in the case. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
58 (1975) (noting that issuing arrest warrants and presiding over arraignments does not
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In a second series of cases, the Supreme Court further expanded the
reach of the Due Process Clause, once again departing from the
common-law of recusal. These cases “emerged in the criminal contempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case
but was challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation
55
56
in an earlier proceeding.” In In re Murchison, a trial judge charged
a defendant with contempt after the defendant refused to answer the
judge’s questions; the judge also charged another individual with per57
jury for failing to answer the judge’s questions truthfully. After the
trial, the very judge that charged both individuals also convicted
58
them. The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court set aside
59
their convictions as violative of Due Process.
Although recognizing that the standard for disqualification “cannot be defined with precision,” the Court held that in this case,
“[h]aving been a part of that [one-man grand jury] process a judge
cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the
60
conviction or acquittal of those accused.” The Court reasoned that
“[a]s a practical matter it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to
free himself from the influence of what took place in his ‘grand-jury’
61
secret session.” The Court distinguished this from ordinary grand
jury proceedings, because here the jury was part of the accusatory
62
process.
63
Next, the Court in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania considered whether
the trial judge who would be sentencing convicted defendants may
also preside over their criminal contempt charges, for contempt
committed against the same trial judge. The Court held that “a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

preclude the trial judge from ultimately hearing the case, even though the judge had to
make a preliminary determination of probable cause); cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 822–23 (1986) (holding that a justice casting the deciding vote on a state
high court to uphold a large punitive award while acting as lead plaintiff in the identical
case below violated due process, although noting that “what degree or kind of interest is
sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting cannot be defined with precision”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 137 (noting that “[a] single ‘judge-grand jury’ is even more a part of the accusatory
process than an ordinary lay grand juror”).
400 U.S. 455 (1971).
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trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.”
As the Court reasoned, a judge in these circumstances “necessarily
becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so
cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary
65
for fair adjudication.”
C. Recent Expansion of Due Process
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
Perhaps the most significant expansion of due process with re66
spect to judicial recusals came in 2009.
In Caperton, the Court held that due process requires a judge to
recuse herself when, based on “objective and reasonable perceptions,” there is a “probability of bias” by the judge towards one of the
67
litigants. The facts leading up to the Supreme Court case began in
2002, when a West Virginia state jury returned a verdict against A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc. (“Massey”), finding it liable to Hugh Caperton,
for $50 million in compensatory damages on a variety of tort theo68
69
ries. The trial court denied Massey’s post-verdict motions in 2004.
Having failed to receive relief at the trial court, Don Blankenship,
Massey’s chairman, resorted to politics in an attempt to reverse the
judgment against his company. Before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia heard Massey’s appeal, Blankenship decided to
support a local attorney, Brent Benjamin, who was campaigning to
70
replace Justice McGraw of the Supreme Court. Blankenship not only contributed $1,000 to Benjamin’s campaign committee, but he also
donated more than $2.5 million to a so-called “527” organization that
71
opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin; this significant donation
constituted more than two-thirds of the organization’s total fund-

64
65
66

67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 466.
Id. at 465.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009) (“This problem arises
in the context of judicial elections, a framework not presented in the precedents we have
reviewed and discussed.”). This latest modification to the Due Process recusal inquiry
comes on the heels of Minnesota Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), which considered the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates to announce their views during
a campaign for judicial office. See infra Part III.
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.
Id. at 2257. The other defendants included Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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72

raising. Blankenship also gave over $500,000 in independent ex73
penditures in support of Benjamin’s candidacy. As the Supreme
Court noted, Blankenship’s contributions and expenditures “were
more than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters
74
and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee.”
In the end, Benjamin won the 2004 judicial election, receiving 53.3%
of the vote, defeating incumbent Justice McGraw who received 46.7%
75
of the vote.
As Massey’s appeal reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, Massey filed a motion to disqualify the newly-elected Justice
Benjamin under both a state statute and the Due Process Clause of
76
77
the U.S. Constitution. The Court denied the motion. The appeal
reached the high court in November 2007, and in a 3–2 ruling, the
Court reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey in an opinion
78
joined by Justice Benjamin.
The defendants sought a rehearing and moved for disqualifica79
tion of three of the five justices who ruled on the appeal. Two of the
justices agreed to recuse themselves, while Justice Benjamin declined
80
to do so, with one justice warning that “Blankenship’s bestowal of
his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ have created a
81
cancer in the affairs of this Court.” At the rehearing, Justice Benjamin was acting as Chief Justice and selected two additional justices to
82
hear the appeal. In April 2008, the high court once again reversed
83
the jury verdict, relieving Massey of its $50 million tort liability. Jus72

73
74

75
76
77

78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. The organization was called “And for the Sake of Kids,” and was organized under 26
U.S.C. § 527. For background on so-called 527s, see generally Richard Kornylak, Note,
Disclosing the Election-Related Activities of Interest Groups Through § 527 of the Tax Code, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 230 (2001).
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. The petitioner in the Supreme Court further contended that “Blankenship spent $1
million more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.” Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2257–58 (finding “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias
for or against any litigant, that this justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and impartial”) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2258. The opinion was not unanimous. For instance, Justice Starcher dissented,
opining that the “majority’s opinion is morally and legally wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2262. As the Court points out, Justice Benjamin wrote four separate opinions during the course of the appeal detailing why no actual bias existed. Id. at 2262–63.
Id. at 2258 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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tice Benjamin found himself in the 3–2 majority again with two Justices writing a scathing dissent: “Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by the
84
majority.”
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and re85
versed.
After noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not previously considered a recusal challenge in the context of judicial elections, the
86
Court reiterated that the test is an objective one. That is, “the Due
87
Process Clause . . . do[es] not require proof of actual bias.” In the
context of judicial elections, the Court held that “there is a serious
risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the
88
case was pending or imminent.” To define this test, the Court asked
“whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
89
process is to be adequately implemented.’”
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that Blankenship’s campaign activities “had a significant and disproportionate
90
influence” in placing Justice Benjamin on the case. This is evident,
the Court reasoned, from the large amount of money that Blanken91
ship spent on this campaign. Although the Court conceded that
Blankenship’s campaign activities might not have directly caused Justice Benjamin’s electoral victory, this was of little significance to the
Court. The size of Blankenship’s contributions relative to the total
amount spent in the election, combined with the small margin of victory, allowed the Court to find that “[t]he risk that Blankenship’s influence engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial that it ‘must
be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately im84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id. at 2267.
Id. at 2263 (“The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is
often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules.”).
Id. (citing, inter alia, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
Id. at 2263–64.
Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1976)).
Id. at 2264.
Id. (comparing Blankenship’s monetary contributions to the total amount raised by the
campaign).
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92

plemented.’” The Court further noted the close temporal relationship between the campaign contributions and the justice’s election
such that it was “reasonably foreseeable” when Blankenship made the
contributions that the appeal would come before Justice Benjamin if
93
he won the election.
The Court concluded by opining that it was addressing “an extraordinary situation,” and that its holding would not cause adverse
94
consequences. Just as with previous decisions addressing extreme
facts giving rise to recusal, the Court believed that lower courts are
“quite capable” of applying the standard that it announced in the
95
case. This is particularly true because state statutes often require recusal above and beyond the constraints of due process that the Court
96
was announcing.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a vigorous dissent, in which he argued
that Caperton will “inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that
judges are biased,” thus eroding the public’s confidence in the im97
partiality of the judiciary. After explaining how the Court has departed from its prior precedents, the Chief Justice posed forty questions to highlight the uncertainties that he believed would result from
98
the majority’s holding. In the end, the Chief Justice predicted that
the Court will “regret” this decision because lower courts will expand
its boundaries, “each claiming the title of ‘most extreme’ or ‘most
99
disproportionate’ [facts].”
Justice Scalia also dissented, arguing that “the principal consequence of today’s decision is to create vast uncertainty” in the thirty100
nine states that elect their judges. He predicted the rise of the “Caperton claim” and the indeterminate law that will have to be applied
101
when adjudicating such claims.
Justice Scalia also lamented that
the decision will reinforce the public perception that litigation is
102
In this case, Justice Scalia believes “the relevant
simply a game.
92
93
94
95
96

97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
Id. at 2264–65.
Id. at 2265.
Id. at 2266.
Id. at 2267 (“Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due
process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the
Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus
be confined to rare instances.”).
Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2269–72.
Id. at 2273.
Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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question . . . is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to
correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional
103
mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule.”
2. Scope of Caperton and Boundaries of Due Process
Caperton has fundamentally changed the interplay between judicial recusals and the Constitution. Given the significance of Caperton
and the questions it leaves open, the boundaries of the decision are
unclear, and lower courts may interpret the case as an invitation to
104
require recusal in an even greater number of situations.
As a preliminary matter, courts interpreting Caperton will undoubtedly struggle with framing the facts of the actual case. On the one
105
hand, the facts have the “feel of a best seller,” not only because they
did make for a best seller—John Grisham’s “The Appeal”—but also
because they ooze corruption and unfairness. In the Court’s own
words they are “extreme,” “extraordinary,” “rare,” and “exception106
al.” On the other hand, both the majority and the public may have
107
exaggerated the facts.
And even on the undisputed facts, as Chief Justice Roberts points
108
out, it is unclear as to how extreme they really are.
Blankenship
had contributed to other candidates in the past, which the dissenters
found “undercut[] any notion that his involvement in this election
was ‘intended to influence the outcome’ of particular pending litiga109
tion.” His only direct contribution amounted to $1,000, and his independent expenditures were not so outlandish when compared to
110
what other lawyers, in aggregate, spent on Benjamin’s opponent.
103
104

105
106
107

108
109
110



Id. at 2275.
See Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up, Must You Stand Down: Caperton and its Limits,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287 (2010) (arguing that the scope and likely application of the
decision “can be informed by the Court’s recent decisions on judicial campaign speech
and campaign finance regulation”); Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 319 (2009) (noting that
the Caperton standard is a “largely unworkable standard for judicial recusal”).
Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Bestseller: Like a Grisham Novel,
W.Va. Dispute Examines Conduct of Elected Judges, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at 1A.
See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267.
See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 104, at 322–23 (“The press depiction of the Caperton
facts is enough to horrify anyone who believes in impartial justice. It is also completely
incorrect.”).
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2274.
Id. at 2273–74 (“Blankenship’s independent expenditures do not appear ‘grossly disproportionate’ compared to other such expenditures in this very election. ‘And for the Sake
of the Kids’—an independent group that received approximately two-thirds of its funding
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The dissenters were also unconvinced that money made the difference in this election—Benjamin’s opponent may have been brought
down by his lack of endorsements, refusal to participate in debates,
111
and a disturbing speech.
And he lost by a healthy margin (seven
points), suggesting that Blankenship’s money was not the deciding
112
factor.
The holding of the case is no less controversial. It raises questions
like “[h]ow much money is too much money?” or “[w]hat level of
contribution or expenditure gives rise to a ‘probability of bias?’”—two
113
of the more than forty questions asked by the dissent. But the more
fundamental issue is whether Caperton is even limited to money.
Reading the holding out of context, the answer seems to be “yes”:
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison
to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent
in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
114
election.

The majority seems particularly troubled by the possibility of one
115
of the litigants buying her own judge.
The underpinning of the
holding, however, is broader than financial contributions; the problem that the court attempts to redress in Caperton is the objective
116
“probability of bias.”
Indeed, to reach its conclusion, the Court
builds on the “principles” set out in a handful of cases for the sole
purpose of highlighting the fundamental problem of judicial bias (ra117
ther than just influence through financial incentives). Revealingly,
none of those cases involved direct contributions and one—In re Mu-

111
112
113
114
115

116
117

from Blankenship—spent $3,623,500 in connection with the election. But large independent expenditures were also made in support of Justice Benjamin’s opponent. ‘Consumers for Justice’—an independent group that received large contributions from the
plaintiffs’ bar—spent approximately $2 million in this race. And Blankenship has made
large expenditures in connection with several previous West Virginia elections, which undercuts any notion that his involvement in this election was ‘intended to influence the
outcome’ of particular pending litigation.”) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2274.
Id.
Id. at 2269.
Id. at 2263–64 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2265 (“Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias
can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—a man chooses the judge in his
own cause. And applying this principle to the judicial election process, there was here a
serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin’s recusal.”).
Id. at 2263.
Id. at 2262.
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118

chison—had nothing to do with money. Of course, Supreme Court
precedent always develops to encompass different circumstances and
factual scenarios. But given Caperton’s focus on the probability of bias, litigants in the courtroom of a judge who had been elected in
“significant” part and as a result of “disproportionate” support from
crusaders against the litigants, would have a plausible claim stemming
119
directly from the holding of the case.
This would not require a particularly robust interpretation of Caperton. As the dissenters point out, it logically flows from the holding
that “there are a number of factors that could give rise to a ‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias: friendship with a party or lawyer, prior
employment experience, membership in clubs or associations, prior
speeches and writings, religious affiliation, and countless other consid120
erations.” Chief Justice Roberts is alarmed by how broad the majority’s holding seems to be. As the Chief Justice wrote: “[T]he standard the majority articulates—‘probability of bias’—fails to provide
clear, workable guidance for future cases. At the most basic level, it is
unclear whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow limited to financial support in judicial elections, or applies to judicial
121
recusal questions more generally.”
If there was any doubt as to whether recusal claims based on the
judge’s speech as a candidate could plausibly be entertained, Chief
Justice Robert’s list of questions seems to put that notion to rest:
9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion
rights if he has received “disproportionate” support from individuals who
feel strongly about either side of that issue? If the supporter wants to
help elect judges who are “tough on crime,” must the judge recuse in all
criminal cases? . . . 20. Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by
newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a
constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias? How would we meas122
ure whether such support is disproportionate?

These uncertainties arise partly because the majority emphasizes the
123
“extremeness” of the case, with the hope that courts will not be
118
119

120
121
122
123



Id. at 2261.
Id. at 2264 (finding that the campaign efforts “had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case”). It is worth noting that the speech
would not have to be the necessary or sufficient factor in the judge’s victory. See id.
Id. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2269 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2269–70.
Id. at 2272 (“To its credit, the Court seems to recognize that the inherently boundless
nature of its new rule poses a problem. But the majority’s only answer is that the present
case is an ‘extreme’ one, so there is no need to worry about other cases. The Court re-
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124

flooded with non-meritorious Caperton claims, but says nothing
about limiting it to financial contributions. It is not difficult to imagine a “speech” Caperton claim that is more “extreme” than one involving a miniscule financial contribution.
Even if the Court did try to limit the holding to instances involving financial contributions, expecting lower courts to be selective in
applying the rule in only “extreme” cases is not realistic—and may
125
indeed be “just so much whistling past the graveyard.” The history
of federal jurisprudence abounds with examples of the Court setting
out rules borne out of some “extreme” cases only to see it grow in the
126
127
district courts.
The dissent provides one such “cautionary tale,”
but there are others. For instance, in 2007 the Supreme Court came
down with its Bell Atlantic v. Twombly decision that raised the pleading
128
standard in certain antitrust actions.
Although the decision appeared to be limited to the antitrust context, many lower courts
quickly seized upon its holding as grounds to raise the pleading stan-

124

125
126

127

128

peats this point over and over. (‘this is an exceptional case’); (‘On these extreme facts’);
(‘Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation’); (‘The facts now before us are
extreme by any measure’); (Court’s rule will ‘be confined to rare instances’).”) (internal
citations omitted).
Id. at 2266 (majority opinion) (“As such, it is worth noting the effects, or lack thereof, of
the Court’s prior decisions. Even though the standards announced in those cases raised
questions similar to those that might be asked after our decision today, the Court was not
flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions. That is perhaps due in part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address. Courts proved quite capable of applying
the standards to less extreme situations.”).
Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. (“There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, rather than
adhering to the legal principle. That cost has been demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: ‘Hard cases make bad law.’”).
The Court summed it up as follows:
Consider the cautionary tale of our decisions in United States v. Halper and Hudson v. United States. Historically, we have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal penalties, not civil ones. But in Halper, the Court held that a
civil penalty could violate the Clause if it were ‘overwhelmingly disproportionate to
the damages [the defendant] has caused’ and resulted in a ’clear injustice.’ We
acknowledged that this inquiry would not be an ‘exact pursuit,’ but the Court assured litigants that it was only announcing ‘a rule for the rare case, the case such
as the one before us.’
Just eight years later, we granted certiorari in Hudson ‘because of concerns
about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of
Halper.’ The novel claim that we had recognized in Halper turned out not to be so
‘rare’ after all, and the test we adopted in that case—‘overwhelmingly disproportionate’—had ‘proved unworkable.’ We thus abandoned the Halper rule, ruing
our ‘ill considered’ ‘deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles.’
Id. at 2272–73 (citations omitted).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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dard in other types of cases. Only two years later, after much uncer130
tainty in the lower courts, the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that Twombly’s heightened pleading standard is gen131
erally applicable in federal court.
Whether “Caperton motions” for recusals based on the judicial
candidates’ platforms will be readily granted as a matter of straight
application of Caperton, or because the holding is not explicitly limited to financial contributions, or because there is seldom uniformity in the application of new standards to the “rare” circumstances—whatever the reason may be, the distinct possibility that
courts will have to deal with a “variety of Caperton motions,” looms
132
large.
Only with the application of a careful balancing test articulated in Mathews can the Court be sure that Caperton affords adequate
due process protection to the litigant in a potentially biased courtroom without sacrificing the confidence in our judicial system or the
133
candidates’ First Amendment rights.

129

130

131
132
133

See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“However, the [Twombly] Court’s
explanation for its holding indicated that it intended to make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that prevailed in the federal courts ever since Conley v. Gibson, was decided half a century ago.”); Leading Cases, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, Civil Procedure: Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 305 (2007) (arguing that a “judicial
opinion is the wrong forum for enacting a major change to settled interpretations of the
Federal Rules,” as the Court did in Twombly).
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts after
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) (“Because Twombly
is so widely cited, it is particularly unfortunate that no one quite understands what the
case holds.”).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009).
See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273.
Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is an old cliché, but sometimes the cure is worse
than the disease. I am sure there are cases where a ‘probability of bias’ should lead the
prudent judge to step aside, but the judge fails to do so. Maybe this is one of them. But I
believe that opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an
amorphous ‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity
of their courts. I hope I am wrong.”). To be sure, the Supreme Court, in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010), characterized Caperton as being
“limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech
could be banned.” This statement does not speak directly to the First Amendment rights
of judges, but to the extent it seeks in dicta to cabin the holding of Caperton, lower courts
and litigants may nonetheless seize upon the language and ambiguities of the decision in
the various ways described throughout this Article.
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON RECUSAL
A. First Amendment Rights of Judicial Candidates
Just as the Due Process Clause protects the right of litigants to a
fair tribunal, the First Amendment protects the judicial candidates’
134
freedom of speech. It is worth noting at the outset that (as the controversial recent Supreme Court decision reaffirmed) the First
135
Amendment includes the right to give money.
More relevant for
this discussion, however, is the idea that the amendment also protects
136
If the Supreme Court or the circuit
the right to receive money.
courts agree, then the argument in this section that there are pressing First Amendment concerns in recusal cases is even more forceful.
But because this paper focuses on recent Supreme Court case law,
where specific First Amendment considerations have been recognized, the discussion that follows centers on judicial candidates’
speech. In a landmark decision, Republican Party v. White, the Supreme Court held that a state may not prohibit judicial candidates
137
from explaining their views on disputed legal issues.
To be sure,
judicial recusals are different from state canons that directly regulate
speech. Nevertheless, as a result of White, even mandatory recusals,
with their potential to chill speech, give rise to First Amendment concerns.
Like most states, Minnesota had judicial conduct canons, which
138
were based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. At issue
in White was Minnesota’s “announce clause” that stated that “a candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge . . . shall
not . . . announce his or her views on disputed legal or political is139
sues.” The controversy arose when Gregory Wersal, running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, distributed literature
in which he criticized several decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
140
Court. After a complaint was filed with the agency responsible for
prosecuting ethical violations of judicial candidates, Wersal withdrew
141
from the race.

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (2010).
See Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d. Cir. 2009).
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 768.
See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1998).
White, 536 U.S. at 765.
Id. at 769.
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Not to be deterred, Wersal ran again two years later, this time
seeking an advisory opinion from the agency on whether it planned
142
The agency’s response was equito enforce the announce clause.
vocal: Although it had doubts about the constitutionality of the provision, it was unable to answer Wersal’s inquiry because he did not
143
submit a list of announcements that he would be making.
Wersal
subsequently filed a lawsuit in federal court that culminated in the
144
White decision.
The Supreme Court was careful in limiting its holding to the announce clause, which was separate from the clause that prohibited
candidates from making promises other than “faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office” (the “pledge” or “promise”
145
clause). The Court’s interpretation of the announce clause, however, was more expansive than what the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
146
The Court conDistrict Court, and the Eighth Circuit offered.
cluded that the clause prohibited a candidate “from stating his views
on any specific nonfanciful legal question . . . except in the context of
discussing past decisions—and in the latter context as well, if he ex147
presses the view that he is not bound by stare decisis.”
Because the announce clause was a content-based regulation of
speech and also burdened a category of speech that is at the core of
what the First Amendment protects, the Court applied strict scruti148
ny.
Without deciding whether impartiality is a compelling inter149
est, or indeed even what interest was advanced by the state, the

142
143
144
145

146
147
148
149



Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 770 (“All the parties agree this is the case, because the Minnesota Code contains a
so-called ‘pledges or promises’ clause, which separately prohibits judicial candidates from
making ‘pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office’—a prohibition that is not challenged here and
on which we express no view.”) (citation omitted); see also Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc.
v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Although the Supreme Court’s decision in White applied only to an announce clause and did not involve a
promises and commit clause, the district court found that the difference in this case is
simply one of label: [T]he State has enforced the promises and commit clause as a de facto announce clause, and therefore the State is unlikely to succeed in light of the binding
precedent in White.”).
White, 536 U.S. at 771–72.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 775.
Courts interpreting White have since found that judicial impartiality can be a compelling
goal. See, e.g., Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (“An impartial judiciary, while a protean term, translates here as the state’s interest in achieving a courtroom
that at least on entry of its robed judge becomes a neutral and disinterested temple, in
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Court held that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to any
150
Quite simply, the
goal that could rise to the level of compelling.
state was regulating speech based on its content, which in the eyes of
151
the majority has little to do with impartiality.
As the Court explained,
[W]hen a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge (as a
candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite
stand is likely to lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or
favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking that position is just as
likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it) evenhanded152
ly.

While the majority opinion clearly left the door open for lower
courts to find that judicial impartiality is a compelling interest, it has
provided little guidance on how a state canon’s restriction on speech
can ever be narrowly tailored. A federal appellate court has suggested one answer. In Jenevein v. Willing, a state judge facing public
pressure over his refusal to withdraw from a case, chose to don his
153
robe and hold a press conference in his courtroom. The commission in charge of investigating ethical charges issued a censure order
154
against the judge. The Fifth Circuit held that the order could only
survive strict scrutiny if it censured the judge for using state equipment, his robe, and the courtroom instead of a public forum: “Today
155
we say only that the state can put the courtroom aside.” The commission, however, went over the line by directing the order at the
156
content of the judge’s speech.
Perhaps the most forceful and memorable lines of White came
from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. A critic of judicial elections,
Justice O’Connor observed that Minnesota “has voluntarily taken on
the risks to judicial bias” by instituting the practice of popularly elect157
ing judges.
As one court summarized O’Connor’s argument, “the
state cannot . . . attempt to have it both ways by electing its judiciary
yet simultaneously gagging its judicial candidates and thus preventing

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

appearance and fact—an institution of integrity, the essential and cementing force of the
rule of law. That this interest is compelling cannot be gainsaid.”).
White, 536 U.S. at 776–77.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 776–77.
Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 561.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
See White, 536 U.S. at 792.
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the voting public from receiving the information necessary to cast an
158
informed vote.”
One of the questions purposefully left open by White is whether
the commit or pledge clauses also run afoul of the First Amend159
ment. No consensus exists either among state or federal courts on
whether these regulations are like the announce clause struck down
160
in White and therefore unconstitutional.
Even if appellate courts or the Supreme Court ultimately limit
White to announce clauses, uncertainty remains over “how, and
whether, this new freedom can coexist with the goal of maintaining a
161
fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.” Armed with White, candidates are free to criticize decisions of judges against whom they are
running—criticism that may be steeped as much in populism as in
the law or legal process. One commentator provides a particularly
pointed view of a world in the wake of White:
Instead of reciting platitudes about how they will be fair and efficient,
judicial candidates will now have to engage each other and stake out distinct positions. They will have to develop campaign platforms, essentially, against which voters can compare their judicial records once elected.
Fueled by rising levels of funds, high-profile advertisements will transmit
the candidates’ messages and the assessments of interested groups to
162
more people. Voter turnout should rise. Retention rates should fall.

Judicial candidates are not the only ones armed with a new found
freedom; interest groups around the country have filed “right to lis-

158
159
160

161

162

Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
White, 536 U.S. at 770.
See Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (pledge and
commit clauses are narrowly construed and constitutional); North Dakota Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044 (D.N.D. 2005) (pledge and commit
clauses are similar in scope to the announce clause and unconstitutional); In re Kinsey,
842 So.2d 77, 86–87 (Fla. 2003) (pledge and commit clauses are different from the announce clause and constitutional); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1170
(Kan. 2008) (citing Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388
F.3d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (pledge and commit clauses are similar in scope to the announce clause and unconstitutional)); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (pledge
clause is different from the announce clause and constitutional).
Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Robert H. Alsdorf,
The Sound of Silence: Thoughts of a Sitting Judge on the Problem of Free Speech and Judiciary in a
Democracy, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 200 (2003); Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake
of White: How States are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How
Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 629 (2005); Nancy Gertner, To Speak
or Not to Speak: Musings on Judicial Silence, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2004); David
Shultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial Selection, 69
ALB. L. REV. 985, 986 (2006)).
David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 297 (2008).
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ten” suits stemming from the questionnaires they have sent to candi163
dates running for state court judgeships.
When candidates have refused to fill out forms that ask them to
announce their views on politically-charged legal questions, like the
right to abortion, these groups have pointed to state canons as the
164
reason for their refusal. Whether these canons are indeed the per165
petrators—or saviors—is less than clear, to say the least. For some
time, third party groups have run into what may have stricken them
as a judicially-imposed formality, called standing: “[T]o maintain a
‘right to listen’ claim, a plaintiff must clearly establish the existence
of a ‘willing speaker’ . . . [because] [i]n the absence of a willing
speaker, ‘an Article III court must dismiss the action for lack of stand166
ing.’”
But this wall may too be crumbling. In a 2008 decision of
Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, where a past judicial candidate claimed
to have been this willing speaker who was discouraged to fill out a
questionnaire because of the canons restricting his speech, the Tenth
Circuit found that the interest group that circulated the question167
naire had standing.
From a legal standpoint, however, White’s reach should not be
overstated; in 2008, the Court, in a unanimous decision, has refused
163

164
165

166

167

See Black, 489 F.3d at 164 (citations omitted). Interest groups’ interest in these questionnaires was not unpredictable, even if the number of the “right to listen” lawsuits is a bit
jarring. See Pozen, supra note 162, at 300 (“The rapid rise in campaign spending, the aggressive outreach done by interest groups and political parties, and the politicization of
campaign speech have transformed many judicial races from sleepy, low-key affairs into
high-stakes, high-salience affairs. They have broken down the traditional regulatory, stylistic, and rhetorical barriers distinguishing judicial elections from other elections. Judicial candidates increasingly invoke their beliefs on abortion, same-sex marriage, tort
reform, and other controversial issues; if they do not proactively do so, interest groups may try to
ferret them out through questionnaires.”) (emphasis added); Barbara E. Reed, Tripping the Rift:
Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER L. REV. 971,
981 (2005).
Black, 489 F.3d at 164 (discussing why judges are reluctant to answer questionnaires on
political issues).
See Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 548 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that of
the candidates who explained why they did not respond to a questionnaire asking for the
views on Roe v. Wade, most explained that they did not rely on the canons, but either felt
it professionally or personally inappropriate to respond); Terry Carter, Loaded Questionnaires? Judicial Candidates Advised to Be Wary of Answers Inviting Suits Challenging Canons, 5
ABA J. E-REPORT 3 (2006) (arguing that the reason why candidates choose to be silent
may well be professional views that judges ought to guard their political views).
Black, 489 F.3d at 166–67 (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856
F.2d 1563, 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also Shepard, 507 F.3d at 550; Alaska Right to Life v.
Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing an interest group’s claim that its
decision to not circulate a questionnaire because of the canons was an inappropriate restriction of speech and dismissing the claim for lack of ripeness).
519 F.3d 1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008).
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to use—indeed even consider—White as a sword to cut through the
168
A candinominating process of judicial candidates in New York.
date may have the right to speak, but, as it turns out, no guarantee
that anyone would listen. The Second Circuit, in Lopez Torres v. New
169
York State Board of Elections, drew on and distinguished White to strike
down the process by which political parties, given their clout, were ef170
fectively choosing state judges. The Supreme Court, without citing
White, overturned the Second Circuit, limiting the candidate’s associational right not to join, while observing that the First Amendment
does not call on the courts to manage the marketplace of ideas “by
171
preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product.”
The fact that being chosen by a political party in New York was, for all
practical purposes, the only way to guarantee an audience for your
speech, had nothing to do with the First Amendment. As the court
observed, it “says nothing more than that the party leadership has
more widespread support than a candidate not supported by the lea172
dership.” Nonetheless, White’s impact on judicial elections is significant: So long as a state chooses to hold popular elections for judges,
White continues to protect candidates’ speech.
B. Recusal as Burdening Speech
Limiting a judicial candidate’s or a sitting judge’s speech through
a judicial canon similar to the one at issue in White is, of course, not
the same as discouraging comments made by judges through the implicit threat of mandatory recusals. To be sure, speech would still be
burdened, if not forbidden, on the basis of its content. And, if it were
made in the course of a campaign, discussing qualifications, that
173
speech is at the core of the First Amendment protection. But both
the process and consequences are different: The regulation is indirect because the speech itself is not prohibited—only presiding over a
case at a later date is—and the result is a potential disqualification

168

169
170
171
172
173

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 196 (2008) (holding that New
York’s system of choosing party nominees for the State Supreme Court does not violate
the First Amendment).
Id.
Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d,
552 U.S. 196 (2008).
See Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 205.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (deeming speech about the
qualifications of candidates for public office to be “at the core of our First Amendment
freedoms”).
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174

from a case, not the judgeship altogether.
These reasons may be
why Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in White suggested that recusals are the preferred method of dealing with troubling comments
175
made by the judges and candidates. And it may be why in interpreting White, some courts have assumed that recusals are the constitu176
tionally permissible alternatives to the canons.
It could also be that recusals are narrowly tailored to the potentially compelling interest of judicial impartiality, in a way that the an177
nounce clause in White was not.
Indeed, in the highest courts of
178
179
two states, New York, and Florida, even traditional pledge clause
canons, not dissimilar from the one mentioned in White, have passed
muster under strict scrutiny. The Florida Supreme Court held that it
is “beyond dispute that [the Canon] serves a compelling state interest[:]” It preserves the “integrity” of the judiciary as “it would be inconsistent with our system of government if a judicial candidate could
campaign on a platform that he or she would automatically give more
credence to the testimony of certain witnesses or rule in a predeter180
mined manner.”
The canon was also narrowly tailored, the court
found, because it allowed the candidate to state his personal views on

174

175

176

177

178
179

180

There are two strands to this argument. First, because recusals are not direct regulations
of speech, they may be deemed incidental. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996). Second, they may be contentneutral, so they would not get the same scrutiny that the state canon did in White. See David K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal
Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 512 (2009).
536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[The state] may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these
standards. What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.”).
See, e.g., In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B.(1)(c) (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (“Recusal, or other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise may be
appropriate under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”).
See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualifications or Suppression: Due Process and the Response to
Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 570 (2004) (discussing the “possibility
of creating speech codes more closely tailored to prevent due process conflicts”).
In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 1 (N.Y. 2003).
In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 77 (Fla. 2003). The canon, that the court described as more
“narrow,” provided in part: “A candidate for judicial office . . . shall not: (i) make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make statements that commit or appear to
commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court.” Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii).
In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 87.
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181

disputed issues.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in In re
Watson upheld its state’s canon under strict scrutiny, observing that
“[j]udges must apply the law faithfully and impartially—they are not
elected to aid particular groups, be it the police, the prosecution or
the defense bar. Campaign promises that suggest otherwise gravely
182
risk distorting public perception of the judicial role.”
Reminded by these decisions, it is not difficult to imagine how an
expansive recusal standard would pass strict scrutiny; after all, it
would target the same concerns and serve the same interests highlighted by the New York and Florida courts. Indeed, at least one
183
federal court has held that a recusal statute satisfied strict scrutiny.
But triggering the strict scrutiny review is in and of itself a signal that
184
there are major First Amendment considerations.
Finally, a plausible argument can be made that recusals, given that
185
they burden speech incidentally, are not subject to strict scrutiny.
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court announced a four-prong, intermediate-like test for laws that have the effect of restricting speech
186
even if they do not aim at expression directly.
As mentioned previously, recusal standards do not forbid speech, but whether they tar187
get speech directly, is a matter of debate. Assuming they do not—
likely a dubious assumption given that it is precisely speech that
would trigger a restriction (recusal) rather than a noncommunicative
act like in O’Brien—and the O’Brien test applies rather than strict scrutiny, they are still an indication that there are major First Amendment

181
182
183

184
185

186

187

Id. (holding that “a candidate may state his or her personal views, even on disputed issues”).
In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 1.
Family Trust Found., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (holding
that a recusal canon and statute are narrowly tailored enough to accomplish a compelling
state interest, thereby passing a test of strict scrutiny).
See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (observing that it is a “rare case”
where a law survives strict scrutiny).
See Dorf, supra note 174, at 1178; Stott, supra note 174, at 504 (citing United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–78 (1968)); cf. Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 200 (6th Cir.
2010) (rejecting argument that free speech challenge to judicial cannon should be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny to “balance[] the competing fundamental rights of
some judicial candidates (who have a right to engage in campaign speech) and some litigants (who have a right to an impartial judiciary)” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (opining that the law must be within the constitutional power of
the government, furthering a substantial interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of
free speech, and the incidental restriction on the first amendment freedoms must be no
greater than necessary).
Since such a standard would presumably list the type of speech that would disqualify a
judge from presiding over a case, it seems that it is speech rather than some other, nonexpressive conduct that is targeted.
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188

concerns.
Indeed, the purpose of intermediate scrutiny is to give
the government “latitude in designing a regulatory” scheme rather
189
than a conclusion that there are no constitutional concerns.
Thus, whatever Justice Kennedy’s reasons may be for embracing
recusals, this form of regulation means that political speech is burdened, chilled, and possibly directly targeted, giving rise to weighty
constitutional concerns that may even merit the highest level of judicial scrutiny when examining legislation. Since this standard emanates from Caperton rather than a statute or canon, the Court is without its most effective tool to ensure that “political
speech . . . prevail[s] against laws that would suppress it by design or
190
inadvertence”—strict scrutiny.
In order to ensure that First
Amendment rights are fairly weighed against litigants’ due process
protections, a careful balancing test should be applied.
IV. RE-THINKING RECUSAL CHALLENGES: TOWARDS A NEW
FRAMEWORK
As explained in more detail above, Caperton’s analysis and holding
may be read to apply in cases that do not involve financial contributions. Indeed, “probability of bias” is as likely born out of a judicial
candidate’s speech against a litigant as it is out of a campaign contribution, as the Caperton dissent points out. As a result, courts must also be prepared to weigh First Amendment considerations. Aside
from the right to receive money—a right that has not yet been recog191
nized by the Court —there are weighty concerns identified by White.
The moment a state institutes judicial elections, the First Amendment
attaches, and judicial candidates have the right to announce their
192
views.
And if Caperton motions begin to mandate recusals, then
speech may be burdened in a constitutionally intolerable way. This
burden does not come from legislation, so the court would be left
without its most powerful tool—strict scrutiny. Precisely for all these
reasons, the due process test developed in Mathews is the perfect antidote: While weighing the litigant’s right to due process, it would
188

189
190
191
192

See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)
(characterizing the O’Brien decision as an instance where even expressive conduct was
deemed deserving of First Amendment protection).
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 213–14 (1997).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010).
See Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing nominal damages in
cases of violations of constitutionally protected rights).
See U.S. CONST. amend I; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that the announce clause violates the First Amendment).

May 2011]

JUDICIAL RECUSAL

1005

consider the First Amendment as well as the integrity of the judicial
system, producing a constitutionally hygienic outcome.
A. Mathews v. Eldridge and the Reach of Its Balancing Test
Mathews requires courts to balance three factors in determining
whether the procedures employed in a particular situation comport
193
with the Due Process Clause. The first factor is the private interest
at stake—that is, the precise nature of the life, liberty, or property in194
terest that risks deprivation. The second factor is the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional substitute procedural sa195
feguards.”
Courts will balance these two factors against the third
factor, which is the government or public interest, “including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
196
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The
Court has used somewhat ambiguous language to describe this last
197
factor, which might vary considerably depending on the nature of
198
the case.

193

194

195
196
197
198

Commentators have analogized the three-factor Mathews test to the three-factor negligence formula famously described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (describing the first factor as “the private interest that will be affected by the official action . . . .”). These interests vary widely,
and might consist of one’s freedom from government confinement, see, e.g., Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), or one’s interest in fair procedures prior to issuing a prejudgment attachment order, see, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Id.
See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11 (noting “any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden”).
See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 466 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting the government’s interest as “national security” under the third prong of Mathews).
Although Mathews speaks in terms of the “government interest,” the Court has made clear
that in a private action, this may include the other private adversary’s interest. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2010). In Doehr, the Court held that the state statute ran
afoul of due process because it allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without
notice and hearing. 501 U.S. at 10. This case was significant in that it applied Mathews in
a case that “pitted private interests against other private interests”; it did not involve a direct challenge to government action as in Mathews itself. See Blair-Stanek, supra at 12–14.
The Court in Doehr adapted the test to “private civil litigants’ use of the court system.”
Blair-Stanek, supra at 12.
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Although developed in the administrative law context, courts have
199
It is
imported the Mathews test into many other areas of the law.
simply not true that the Mathews test is applied only to weigh adequacy of administrative procedures when property interests are at stake,
although this is a significant area where Mathews is applied. For example, the Court applied the Mathews test in weighing a company’s
due process right after an agency ordered immediate reinstatement
200
of a fired employee with back pay. Additionally, Mathews has been
applied in civil adjudication. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, the Court applied Mathews to hold that the government generally may not use an ex parte civil forfeiture proceeding to seize real
201
property.
This case came two years after Doehr, where the Court
used Mathews to hold that a state statute ran afoul of due process because it allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without notice
202
and hearing.
It is important to note that although the Mathews test has been
203
applied in many contexts, the Court has “never viewed Mathews as
204
announcing an all–embracing test for deciding due process claims.”
Indeed, the Supreme Court has carved out certain areas where a dif205
206
ferent test should apply. For instance, in Medina v. California, the
Supreme Court held that the Mathews test is not sufficiently deferential in the area of criminal procedure and process, namely in allocating burdens of proof. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Weiss v. United
States held that the Mathews test is not appropriate for reviewing decisions by a military court because in the military context “[j]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when reviewing congressional decision199

200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (relying on Mathews to hold that a citizen labeled as an
“enemy-combatant” was entitled to received notice of the factual basis for his classification and challenge it before a neutral decision-maker).
Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987).
510 U.S. 43, 53–55 (1993).
501 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1991).
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Mathews test is the “orthodox” method of evaluating procedural due process claims).
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002).
See, e.g., id. at 167 (stating that when evaluating adequacy of method used to give notice, a
more “straightforward test of reasonableness” has been used).
505 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1992). But see Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308,
2332 n.3 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that whether Mathews applies when evaluating state procedures for allowing state inmates access to new evidence is not necessarily foreclosed by Medina); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (applying the Mathews standard to weigh the standard of proof necessary to terminate parental rights for
neglect); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (applying Mathews by a unanimous Court to find that a “clear and convincing evidence” was the minimum evidentiary
standard required to commit someone to a mental health facility).
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207

making.”
Taken together, these cases suggest that the court does
not apply Mathews when one interest at stake is so weighty that the
court should give deference to that interest and not balance it with
others. These areas, however, are narrow, and have been interpreted
as such. For instance, in Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that Mathews is inapplicable in criminal cases;
Medina, the court explained, dealt only with constitutional guarantees
208
in criminal proceedings regarding burdens of proof.
B. Mathews Meets Caperton
Caperton fundamentally changed the interplay between judicial recusal (and judicial elections) and the Constitution. Given the uncertainty over the reach of Caperton and the constitutional freedoms it
potentially implicates, courts should use the Mathews test to determine whether the Due Process Clause requires recusal. Although
one might struggle in vain to reconcile the Supreme Court’s varied
use of the Mathews test, a review of the policies underlying many of
the cases using Mathews supports the notion of applying Mathews in
the context of judicial recusal. In some ways, applying Mathews in this
context is more compelling than anywhere else: The test not only allows the court to carefully arrive at a fair result, but it holds Caperton
together, with its principles intact. That is, it would allow the courts
to confront the tension between due process and First Amendment
rights without judging whether the case is sufficiently “extreme”—an
209
exercise that was derided by the Chief Justice in Caperton’s dissent.
1. Applying Mathews Is Appropriate
First, it is worth noting that simply because Mathews has not, to
date, been applied by the Supreme Court to recusal challenges does
not mean that it cannot be applied. Those that argue Mathews cannot
be applied in this context contend that the Supreme Court’s recusal
jurisprudence evinces a deliberate absence of any citation to Ma210
thews.
Although this argument cannot be discounted, it is by no

207
208
209
210

510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
464 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2006).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272–74 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See Friedland, supra note 177, at 575 n.48; John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non) Problem of a
Limited Due Process Right to Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799, 1820
(2009).
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211

means controlling.
The Supreme Court has never suggested that
Mathews cannot be applied to recusal challenges under the Due
Process Clause, and, in fact, one federal district court recently cited
212
Mathews in this regard. Moreover, importing Mathews into this context is consistent with the Supreme Court’s “deep—and growing—
213
Recently, the Court in Hamdi reattachment to the Mathews test.”
lied on the Mathews test to hold that a citizen labeled by the government as an “enemy-combatant” was entitled to receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification and challenge it before a neutral de214
cision-maker.
The argument in favor of applying Mathews in this
context is more persuasive in light of additional factors raised by Caperton that must be balanced with a litigant’s due process rights.
Additionally, applying Mathews would not be that ground-breaking
because its balancing test has been applied in circumstances analogous to judicial recusals. Many of the cases challenging administrative
procedures occur in the context of adjudications and demonstrate
courts’ willingness to scrutinize the components of adjudications that
contribute to a fair outcome, including the identity of the decision
maker. For instance, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to a federal statutory scheme that remitted all
penalties for violations of federal labor laws to the federal agency that
215
imposed penalties.
The statute was challenged under the Due
Process Clause on the basis that it created an impermissible risk of bias by encouraging the agency to impose “unduly numerous and large
216
assessments of civil penalties.” The Court upheld the statute, refusing to apply the “strict requirements of judicial neutrality” to the de217
terminations of an administrative prosecutor. The Court then cited
Mathews for the proposition that “the neutrality requirement helps to

211

212

213

214
215
216
217

Cf. Chen v. Gonzales, 177 F. App’x 159, 160 (2d Cir. 2006); Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v.
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2006); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062,
1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Shinn v. Champion Mortg. Co., No. 09-CV-0013, 2010 WL 500410,
at *7 n.4 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010).
Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71274 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2007)
(citing Mathews in considering whether state recusal standards comport with due
process).
See Blair-Stanek, supra note 198, at 12; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781
(2008); City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (applying Mathews to city procedures following the towing of a resident’s car).
542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004).
446 U.S. 238, 239 (1980).
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 250.
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guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis
218
of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.”
Similarly, as Connecticut v. Doehr suggests, Mathews is often used to
evaluate the fairness of state and federal judicial proceedings. For instance, where the Supreme Court has had to weigh the adequacy of
judicial process for a criminal defendant, it has chosen to use the Mathews test. In United States v. Raddatz, the Court considered whether
due process permits a district judge to rule on a motion to suppress
219
based only on the record made by a magistrate judge.
The Court
applied the Mathews test without analysis, as if Mathews were the de220
fault test.
Other examples in this regard include Parham v. J.R.,
where the Court used Mathews to evaluate the constitutionality of a
procedure that allowed parents to commit their children to a mental
221
health facility.
Similarly, in the famous case of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court employed Mathews to determine whether due process
requires the state to provide an indigent parent with counsel in a
222
proceeding to terminate her parental rights.
And, as noted above, the Court recently applied Mathews to determine whether a citizen held as an “enemy-combatant” was entitled
to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and chal223
lenge it before a neutral decision-maker. As these cases show, Mathews has been applied in various contexts, most noteworthy of which
include cases where individual rights were weighed against the state,
in criminal cases, and where the fairness of the decision-maker was at
stake—all important components of cases where Caperton motions will
be made. Just as importantly, Mathews has been called the default test
and one that involves the most careful balancing of rights.
2. Applying Mathews Is Good Policy
The benefit of applying the Mathews test to recusal motions is that
it preserves existing precedent, while providing the flexibility neces-

218

219
220
221
222

223

Id. at 242. Although the Court thought it relevant that the agency acted more as a prosecutor than a judge, the case nonetheless demonstrates that the Court has at least used
Mathews in the context of challenging the impartiality of a decision-maker.
447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).
Id.
442 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1979).
452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Court weighed the complexity of the proceeding and the capacity of the parent to weigh the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s right. Id. at
31–32.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2004).
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sary to address new concerns raised by Caperton. Put another way,
Mathews is a natural outgrowth of existing recusal precedent and will
allow courts to respond to the myriad issues that might arise in the
future.
In cases raising pre-Caperton concerns, such as direct pecuniary in224
225
terest and personal animosity, Mathews will generally leave the existing legal landscape unchanged. These types of cases have focused
226
on the specific rights of individuals to fair tribunals, rather on the
more macro-issues like the public or government interest. Courts
have sometimes found that the individual right to a fair tribunal is so
strong and no countervailing interest exists that the cases are not sus227
ceptible to balancing.
While this may initially seem to mitigate
against applying Mathews, a closer examination shows otherwise; even
if Mathews were applied, the cases would likely come out the same
way, since the first two factors—individual interest and risk of an erroneous deprivation—would likely outweigh the public interest,
which in any case would be either small or completely in line with the
228
public interest (i.e., to vindicate the litigant’s due process rights).
With regard to motions raising Caperton concerns—including
campaign contributions, “prior speeches and writings” of the judge,
229
or other factors that give rise to an objective appearance of bias, a
flexible approach is needed. Caperton motions implicate two compet230
ing interests: The First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Since, as discussed above, Caperton may invite lower courts to expand
its holding into new areas in which there exists an objective appearance of bias, including extra-judicial speech, the case risks chilling
the speech of judges who seek to avoid disqualification. As one
commentator noted, “[j]udicial elections present a dilemma for candidates because their desire to say things that might win votes clashes
231
with their duty to ensure due process.”
Indeed, Justice O’Connor

224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971).
See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text.
See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
Cf. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111–12 (1973)
(noting the public interest in fairness).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2268 (2009) (emphasis in original).
See Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate
Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1120-21 (2006).
See Shepard, supra note 4, at 24.
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goes so far as to argue that judicial elections as an institution under232
mine the public interest in appearance of a fair tribunal.
The fact of judicial elections challenges the deeply-rooted idea in
American law that a decision-maker must be neutral—that is, not
committed to an outcome before the parties present their arguments.
But many candidates for judicial office, for example, often campaign
on ‘tough-on-crime’ platforms, and “jockey for the position of who
233
will treat defendants more harshly.”
Once elected, political pressure may persuade the judge to treat criminal defendants in a manner that pleases the electorate, rather than in a way that would dis234
pense justice to the defendant.
This contravenes the important
counter-majoritarian benefit of judicial review, which exists to protect
235
individual rights against the majority.
Adding fuel to the fire, White opens the door for—indeed encourages—the type of speech that would undermine a litigant’s right to
due process. First, White allows judicial candidates to announce their
236
views and to criticize decisions.
Even if a state has the (arguably)
constitutional promise clause—forbidding judicial candidates from
making specific promises on how they would rule in future cases—the
practical effect of White is permitting candidates to announce concrete views on issues that will likely come before them as judges. It
does not take much for the electorate to make the connection be237
tween one’s views and one’s actions after donning the robe. Should
232
233
234
235
236
237



See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Weiss, supra note 230, at 1105 (citing numerous examples of similar campaign platforms).
Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 199, 200 n.97, 201 (1996).
See id. at 206 n.123.
See White, 536 U.S. at 765.
As Justice Ginsburg, in dissent in White, explained:
Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or promises is easily
circumvented. By prefacing a campaign commitment with the caveat, ‘although I
cannot promise anything,’ or by simply avoiding the language of promises or
pledges altogether, a candidate could declare with impunity how she would decide
specific issues. Semantic sanitizing of the candidate’s commitment would not,
however, diminish its pernicious effects on actual and perceived judicial impartiality. To use the Court’s example, a candidate who campaigns by saying, ‘If elected,
I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power to prohibit same-sex marriages,’ will
feel scarcely more pressure to honor that statement than the candidate who stands
behind a podium and tells a throng of cheering supporters: ‘I think it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.’ Made during a campaign, both statements contemplate a quid pro quo between candidate and voter.
Both effectively ‘bind [the candidate] to maintain that position after election.’
And both convey the impression of a candidate prejudging an issue to win votes.
Contrary to the Court’s assertion, the ‘nonpromissory’ statement averts none of
the dangers posed by the ‘promissory’ one.
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the judge fail to live up to his words as a candidate, he will be punished at the polls next time around. The next candidate will make
the same “announcements” (dare we say promises?) and be sure to
live up to them. And so it goes.
Second, as discussed in more detail earlier, White has encouraged
organizations, mostly of conservative stripes, to issue detailed questionnaires about the judicial candidate’s or judge’s thoughts on hotbutton issues, such as abortion. If the candidate was reluctant to announce his positions before, he may have little choice now, as more
than enough rivals will eagerly put their views on paper. And if the
candidate was oddly open-minded before, he will be encouraged, or
at least perceived to be, more committed now. The result is that in
states where judges are elected, few litigants will walk into a courtroom, expecting due process, but face a judge who has not been on
record announcing his stance on a legal issue. If that issue is being
adjudicated in the litigant’s case, he can hardly expect anything like
238
the due process our Constitution guarantees.
239
In contrast to cases like Medina v. California and Weiss v. United
240
States, no one interest is so weighty in this context to preclude use
241
Both the protections of procedural due process and
of Mathews.
the First Amendment are important individual rights that cannot defer to one another as a matter of law in the same way that certain interests may yield to the deference of the military. Instead of creating
rigid rules, the tension between procedural due process and the First
Amendment is best settled through a flexible balancing approach
242
under the circumstances.
By using the Mathews test, courts will adequately balance these often-competing interests. The first factor is “the private interest that

238
239
240
241

242

536 U.S. at 819–20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2252 (2009).
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
510 U.S. 163 (1994).
Justice Stevens made this point in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County,
North Carolina, where in his dissent he opined:
The issue [of having counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding] is
one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal benefits. Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors, judges,
and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, I would reach
the same result in this category of cases. For the value of protecting our liberty
from deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless.
452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005) (applying Mathews to determine
what process is due to an inmate because due process in this situation calls for a flexible
approach).
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243

will be affected by the official action.”
In this regard, courts may
ask, among other things, what the litigant may stand to gain or lose in
244
the action; whether it is a criminal or civil matter; and whether, in a
criminal case, the defendant is charged with a felony or misdemea245
nor. The second factor is the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
246
any, of additional substitute procedural safeguards.” The weight of
this factor depends on the precise circumstances of the case, but the
inquiry will generally look to the degree of potential bias, i.e. the
greater the objective appearance of impropriety, the more weight this
factor holds.
Against these two factors courts will balance the public interest.
In addition to the public interest in procedural fairness, the public
247
also has an interest in protecting the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he First Amendment creates an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete
248
without government interference. If recusal burdens speech, then
affording too much weight to a litigant’s due process rights may infringe upon the presiding judge’s right to speak outside the courtroom, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas. And even if recusal does not burden speech, the
public still has an important interest in permitting the presiding
249
judge to speak his views outside the courtroom, especially if the
state has made a determination to permit judicial elections.
Additionally, separate and apart from these First Amendment
concerns, courts may consider other factors that weigh into the public interest. As suggested by the Caperton dissent, the case raises the
250
prospect of a flood of non-meritorious recusal motions, which
243
244

245

246
247

248
249
250



Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975).
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (noting that the
individual interest in retaining employment is significant, given the severity of depriving
one of a livelihood).
See Rachel S. Weiss, Note, Defining the Contours of United States v. Hensley: Limiting the Use
of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1339–41 (2009) (noting
the common law roots of the felony/misdemeanor distinction).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (opining that “the importance of protecting freedom of speech is to foster the marketplace of ideas. If speech,
even unconventional speech that some find lacking in substance or offensive, is allowed
to compete unrestricted in the marketplace of ideas, truth will be discovered”).
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008).
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting
the public interest in the “free flow of information”).
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (“As such, it is worth
noting the effects, or lack thereof, of the Court’s prior decisions. Even though the stan-
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would operate to undermine public confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary. As a result, courts may consider specific grounds for
recusal in light of the public interest in maintaining the integrity of
251
the judiciary by discouraging non-meritorious recusal motions.
Additionally, the public has an interest in preventing litigants from
gaming the system. Since the opposite of gratitude is revenge, a potential litigant might purposefully oppose a judge’s election campaign for the purpose of later making a motion to disqualify the
252
judge under Caperton. Allowing courts to take situations like this into account under the public interest, Mathews would operate to discourage such a practice, thus bolstering the integrity of the judicial
system.
V. CONCLUSION
The merits of judicial elections have been litigated in journals
253
around the country. In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions
in White and Caperton, this debate will only intensify. Rather than revisit the arguments for and against electing judges, this Article has argued that applying the Mathews test in cases where a litigant’s due
process is threatened by an elected judge—a possibility that the Court
254
initially dismissed in White against Justice Ginsburg’s protests, and
then took head on in Caperton—will balance First Amendment rights
that judicial elections breed against the rights of the litigants that the
Constitution protects. This test would also be mindful of the larger
concern voiced by the Caperton dissent: That Caperton motions will
undermine the integrity of the judiciary. In sum, the flexibility and
elegance of the test in this context is also made timely in light of the
uncertainty raised by the Court’s expansive rulings in the areas of

251
252
253

254

dards announced in those cases raised questions similar to those that might be asked after our decision today, the Court was not flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions.
That is perhaps due in part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address.
Courts proved quite capable of applying the standards to less extreme situations.”).
Cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct 1093, 1099 (2009) (noting, in another context, the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral system).
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 32–33, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009) (No. 08-22).
Indeed, the topic of judicial election is the single most written about topic in academia.
See Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of
Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986); Pozen, supra note 162, at 269.
See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant’s
right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to ‘an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.’”) (citation omitted).
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judicial elections, due process protection, and First Amendment
rights. Lower courts should be relieved that they would not need to
break new ground to apply Mathews in this context. And the Chief
Justice’s prediction that the Court will have to revisit Caperton to
measure the “extremeness” of the facts in future cases may not come
255
true after all.

255

Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe we will come to regret
this decision as well, when courts are forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton motions, each claiming the title of ‘most extreme’ or ‘most disproportionate.’”).

